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Global Environmental Protection 
E. Wesley F. Peterson
Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Nebraska–Lincoln 
Abstract 
An international environmental organization would need to be loosely structured initially 
with a focus on a narrow range of environmental issues. It also would need to emphasize 
consensus and limit the scope of its interventions to avoid defections by important partici-
pants. The benefits of such an organization include the potential for achieving more nearly 
optimal levels of environmental protection, cost savings from reduction of duplication and 
managerial economies of scale, and the strengthening of environmental interests in nego-
tiations on the coordination of the environmental regime with other international regimes 
such as those focusing on trade or development. 
Public goods are characterized by some degree of nonrivalry in consump-
tion as well as difficulty in excluding noncontributors from consuming the good. 
These characteristics mean that private agents interacting in competitive markets 
will generate less than optimal amounts of such goods. In national contexts, gov-
ernments may supply certain public goods, although some, such as television 
broadcasts, also may be supplied by the private sector. In an international setting, 
the provision of public goods is problematic because there is no international au-
thority to play the role that governments have in national settings. Kindleberger 
notes that the primary international public good is peace, something that, histori-
cally, has been severely undersupplied. 
Sovereign nation-states face a wide array of international issues where coop-
eration is needed to attain the best possible outcome. Two problems are inherent 
in this process. First, it is often difficult to identify and articulate national consen-
suses on these issues. Second, even if national political systems generate a consen-
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sus position, policymakers and politicians may understand that they could gain 
by misrepresenting or hiding national preferences or otherwise behaving in an 
uncooperative manner in their dealings with the broader international commu-
nity. The purpose of this article is to explore some of the issues associated with 
the creation and design of organizations to overcome these difficulties. 
The specific international public good that is the focus of this article is global 
environmental protection. One aspect of this issue that has generated an exten-
sive literature is the potential for conflict between environmental protection and 
international trade liberalization (Esty; Runge, 1994; Johnson and Beaulieu; An-
derson and Blackhurst; Zaelke et al.). The relationship between trade and the 
environment was first identified as an important issue in the 1970s (Baumol; 
d’Arge and Kneese). Renewed interest in this question has been stimulated by 
recent and anticipated trade negotiations. Many of the demonstrators at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) planning meeting in Seattle in December 1999 
believe that trade liberalization and environmental protection are incompatible. 
The apparent conflict between the international public goods of an open trad-
ing system and global environmental protection has led to wide-ranging pro-
posals for organizational and institutional reform. For some, international trade 
(and everything else) should be completely subordinated to environmental rules 
(Krause et al.; Krause; Paden). Others call for changes in the WTO that take ac-
count of environmental problems in the pursuit of free trade (McGeorge). A dif-
ferent approach is to further develop international environmental institutions 
and organizations to ensure cooperation on environmental issues, leaving trade 
and other international questions to existing structures. For example, Esty has 
called for the establishment of a “global environmental organization” to defend 
environmental principles in the same way that the WTO defends principles of 
liberal trade (see also the lead editorial in The Economist, October 9, 1999). It is 
this idea that is the focus of this article. 
The discussion is organized as follows: In the first section the public goods 
problem in an international context is described. In the second section the litera-
ture on the economics of international organizations is reviewed and used to de-
velop a conceptual framework for the design of supranational institutions. This 
framework is used to analyze proposals to create an international environmental 
organization in the third section. 
The Problem of Public Goods 
The public goods problem can be represented by the familiar prisoners’ di-
lemma from game theory (see Sandler). The prisoners are unable to establish 
an enforceable contract, so they end up following the dominant strategy of de-
fecting from the cooperative solution. As a result, they are collectively worse 
off than they would have been had they been able to reach the cooperative out-
come. In the case of public goods, defection is referred to as free-riding. If large 
numbers of individuals choose to free-ride, the public good will not be provided 
at all despite the fact that most of these same individuals actually would prefer 
to have it. Governments, the classic enforcers of contracts, can offer a way out 
of this dilemma by forcing everyone to contribute to the provision of the public 
good. Of course, those who truly would prefer not to see the public good sup-
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plied may end up as “unwilling” riders (Schmid). The incentives to defect are 
generated by the two characteristics of public goods noted earlier, jointness or 
nonrivalry and difficult excludability. A pure public good, such as national de-
fense or world peace, has both characteristics. A pure private good has neither. 
Between these two extremes is found a wide variety of impure public goods 
such as cable television broadcasts that are nonrival but from which viewers 
who have not paid for their subscription can be excluded or open-access com-
mon-pool resources, such as fisheries, which are rival but from which it is diffi-
cult to exclude individual users. 
Legal systems are pure public goods. This is true within a country and ap-
plies equally to international law. Runge (1990) has shown that efforts to liber-
alize international trade constitute an international public good that is likely to 
be plagued by free-rider problems. For many national governments, the best ar-
rangement would be to protect politically powerful national industries while the 
governments of all other countries remain committed to free trade. Protectionism, 
according to this account, is a form of free-riding. The same kind of reasoning 
would apply to institutions to regulate such environmental problems as global 
warming. If all other countries reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases, a free-
rider would be able to realize the benefits of reduced global warming without ex-
periencing the costs of changing its use of fossil fuels. For international public 
goods, provision in optimal amounts is problematic because of the lack of inter-
national authority to backup any agreements reached. International organizations 
are often imperfect substitutes for governments that have legislative, policing, 
and enforcement powers. 
One approach to the study of international public goods is based on the con-
cept of international regimes (Keohane; Young, 1989, 1993). According to Young 
(1993), “regimes are social practices based on constellations of rights and rules 
that govern interactions among the occupants of recognizable roles defined with 
reference to more or less distinct issue areas” (p. 245). International regimes may 
include some kind of international organization charged with various func-
tions related to the operation of the regime (Young, 1993). Thus the international 
trade regime would have the WTO at its center but also would include regional 
trade agreements, public and private associations involved in trade (chambers of 
commerce, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development), and all relevant com-
mercial law whether administered by national, regional, or international organi-
zations. The international environmental regime lacks a centralized equivalent to 
the WTO but includes a large number of organizations, treaties, and other insti-
tutions aimed at resolving environmental conflicts and protecting environmen-
tal resources. In 1993, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) listed 
171 international environmental agreements, most of which had secretariats or 
other types of organizational structures. Both the trade and the environmental re-
gimes can be thought of as institutional structures designed to solve particular 
international public goods problems in the absence of a world government. The 
existence of complex international regimes does not ensure that the world com-
munity will be able to achieve desirable levels of cooperation. The incentives for 
individuals and governments to free-ride are great, and it is often difficult to de-
tect and punish such behavior. 
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The Design of Supranational Institutions 
Two issues must be addressed in considering the design of supranational or-
ganizations and regimes aimed at overcoming these problems in the provision of 
international public goods. The first is the feasibility of creating such structures, 
and the second is the optimal form of the institutional arrangement. The first is-
sue can be characterized as a two-level game (Putnam). The first level of the game 
takes place in domestic political settings where various interests vie for influence 
on the shape of the set of possible international agreements (the win set). The sec-
ond level involves international negotiation to discover the institutional arrange-
ment that lies in the intersection of all the national win sets. The feasibility issue 
arises because it may be impossible for national political leaders to articulate a 
level-one consensus or because national win sets do not intersect. 
The feasibility of establishing an international organization thus is strongly in-
fluenced by domestic considerations and perceived possibilities for beneficial initia-
tives at the international level. Cauley et al. suggest that the likelihood of forming 
nonmarket structures to handle the public goods problem depends on the num-
ber of participants, the kinds of expectations (“conjectures”) participants have re-
garding the behavior of the others, and the anticipated costs of creating the orga-
nizations. The greater the number of participants, the greater is the difficulty of 
controlling free-riding. Expectations about the behavior of the other participants re-
flect strategic considerations. Cauley et al. show that when participants expect free-
riding, they probably will be unable to solve the public goods problem. If partici-
pants can be assured that others are cooperating, very different expectations may 
arise. Runge (1992) has argued that the problem of public goods provision is often 
better represented as an assurance problem than as a prisoners’ dilemma (see also 
Sandler). Institutions for providing assurance that cooperative behavior is the norm 
increase the likelihood of discovering cooperative solutions to the public goods 
problem. Finally, high anticipated costs can prevent agreement. 
If a supranational organization appears to be feasible, the second issue is the 
form of such an organization. For Sandler and Cauley and Cauley et al., form 
is represented by the degree of integration (tightness) of the participants in the 
agreement. The degree of integration ranges from none (noncooperative Nash 
equilibria) to complete cooperation or collusion. In general, both the costs and 
benefits of the organizational structure, relative to the noncooperative situation, 
increase with the degree of integration. For any feasible arrangement, the benefits 
have to be greater than the costs (Frattiani and Pattison). In the case of interna-
tional public goods, benefits may include provision of the public goods if, in the 
absence of cooperation, the public good would not be provided at all due to the 
expected free-riding. Otherwise, the benefits of cooperation would be reflected in 
the more nearly optimal level of provision of the public good compared with the 
noncooperative situation. 
Sandler and Cauley suggest that the optimal form of organizational arrange-
ment is found by maximizing the difference between benefits and costs. The costs 
related to provision of international public goods through supranational struc-
tures include decision-making costs, information and communication costs, en-
forcement and policing costs, and interdependency costs (Sandler and Cauley; 
Cauley et al.). Decision-making costs arise from the need to reach agreement on 
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the form and functioning of the organization. In particular, the kind of decision 
rule (simple majority, supermajority, unanimity) adopted can lead to greater or 
lesser costs of negotiation and bargaining. Clearly, a decision rule based on una-
nimity would require more time and effort in reaching agreement than a simple 
majority vote. One of the reasons the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations took 
such a long time to complete (1986–1994) is the requirement that agreements be 
approved unanimously. 
Information and communication are needed to make decisions and to oper-
ate the institutions. In addition, mechanisms to police and enforce the agreement 
must be established to provide participants with the assurance that others are 
complying with the decisions taken. Finally, in international settings, there may 
be political costs associated with loss of national sovereignty as the international 
organizations assume control of some of the functions previously carried out by 
national governments. All these costs rise with the degree of integration, the in-
trusiveness of the decision rule chosen, and the number of participants. It has 
been argued that the Law of the Sea agreement was so tightly structured that it 
was bound to provoke opposition from countries such as the United States, where 
the political costs of the agreement simply appeared to be too high (Sebenius). 
In addition to the benefits of international public goods that would not be sup-
plied in the absence of international cooperation, international organizations may 
generate other benefits for participants. Efficiency gains due to scale economies in 
the provision of the public good, the greater amount of information made avail-
able through the supranational structures, and increased political prestige for 
those who participate in the agreement are examples. As with costs, these bene-
fits increase with the number of participants and the degree of integration. For in-
ternational public goods such as environmental protection, it may be the case that 
only a very inclusive agreement involving many nations will be able to generate 
substantial benefits. In this context, the role of hegemonic powers can be very im-
portant. Active leadership by the United States, the European Union, and Japan 
generally ensures that multilateral trade negotiations eventually will bear fruit. 
On the other hand, U.S. opposition to the Law of the Sea agreement has signifi-
cantly reduced its effectiveness (Sebenius). The degree of integration reflects the 
ability of the international arrangement to force compliance, so the greater the 
level of integration, the more likely it is that free-riding will be controlled. 
Sandler and Cauley refer to the degree of integration as “tightness” and ar-
gue that the marginal benefits of supranational organizational structures dimin-
ish as tightness increases, whereas marginal costs increase with tightness (see also 
Sandler, pp. 144–164). These properties ensure that the difference between bene-
fits and costs is maximized where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. In the 
case of international public goods, diminishing marginal benefits and increasing 
marginal costs seem intuitively reasonable. For example, the benefits provided by 
NATO may increase as additional countries join, but the addition to the benefits 
provided by adding Hungary to an alliance that includes the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and France may be small. In contrast, marginal orga-
nizational costs can be expected to increase as the institutions become more com-
prehensive and complex. 
One problem with this type of representation is that there may be thresholds 
beyond which the public good will be supplied but below which it will not. This 
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problem can be handled by assessing the feasibility of providing the public good 
before attempting to derive the optimal organizational structure (see Sandler and 
Cauley). Many of the conceptual models used to evaluate the likelihood of form-
ing supranational organizations are based on simple situations involving only 
two countries. When they are extended to the case of many countries, additional 
layers of complexity arise. For example, Cauley et al. show that there are fixed 
costs of forming nonmarket linkages between each participant in the agreement 
and argue that the benefits of each linkage have to be greater than these fixed 
costs for that linkage to be viable. If organizational effectiveness depends on a 
large number of linkages, the fixed costs could preclude agreement. 
In summary, decisions to establish supranational organizations must take ac-
count of the kinds of benefits and costs associated with such arrangements as 
compared with the noncooperative equilibrium. A necessary condition for the vi-
ability of such structures is that the benefits be greater than the costs. However, 
this condition is far from sufficient. International agreements require commit-
ments from sovereign nation-states that may have very different objectives. In ad-
dition, the nature of the benefits and costs varies with the institutional arrange-
ments under consideration. The critical factors in designing such organizations 
include the degree of integration, the number of participants, and the type of de-
cision rule adopted. In the next section the conceptual framework outlined above 
is used to consider the feasibility and design of an international environmental 
organization (IEO). 
Designing an International Environmental Organization 
The question posed in this part of the article is whether an IEO as described in 
several proposals (Esty; Runge, 1994) could be designed to defend environmen-
tal principles in the way that the WTO defends liberal trade principles. In ana-
lyzing the advantages and disadvantages of an IEO, it is first necessary to define 
the alternative that forms the basis for comparison. The current environmental re-
gime is characterized by moderate cooperation and numerous decentralized or-
ganizations charged with handling widely differing environmental issues. Esty 
characterizes the current situation as a prisoners’ dilemma that generates signif-
icant free-riding resulting in less than optimal amounts of global environmental 
protection (see also Hoel). In contrast, Carraro and Siniscalco argue that stable, 
beneficial arrangements on environmental protection can arise spontaneously de-
spite the apparent noncooperative structure of these interdependencies. If true, 
this would mean that only limited supranational structures would be needed to 
protect the environment because nations will see that it is in their interests to vol-
untarily contribute to the provision of the public good. This conclusion does not 
seem tenable, however, given that significant environmental degradation is oc-
curring. For example, overfishing has become such a problem that several Cana-
dian and New England fisheries have almost been destroyed (Economist Survey, 
May 23, 1998, p. 8). Most of the evidence would seem to suggest that the alterna-
tive to further efforts to institute international cooperation would be a Nash equi-
librium in which significant environmental destruction would continue to occur, 
although some environmental protection would end up being supplied through 
specific agreements and limited amounts of unilateral efforts. 
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Some authors favor restructuring the WTO as an approach to global environ-
mental protection (McGeorge). Others point to the environmental side agreement 
to NAFTA as a possible model for reconciling trade and environmental issues 
(Runge, 1994; Johnson and Beaulieu). Bhagwati has noted that environmental 
questions will be prominent in future multilateral trade negotiations in the con-
text of the WTO and the same will be true for regional trade talks. This does not 
mean, however, that attempting to use the trade regime as a vehicle for solving 
global environmental problems is a good idea. Anderson (1992) and Runge (1992) 
have shown that using trade policies to achieve environmental objectives is likely 
to be ineffective in controlling free-riding and could seriously undermine the pri-
mary purpose of the WTO, which is to promote principles of liberal trade. On the 
other hand, in an extensive exercise in second-best analysis, Rauscher shows that 
there may be cases where trade barriers are appropriate for environmental protec-
tion if first-best environmental policies are unattainable. For the purposes of the 
following discussion, strategies to resolve global environmental issues through 
modification of international trade institutions will not be considered. 
A stylized image of an IEO can be developed from Esty’s discussion. He ar-
gues that an “overarching” environmental organization is needed because the 
current global environmental regime is allowing substantial irreversible environ-
mental damage to occur. Economists favor the institution of such mechanisms 
as tradable pollution permits, pollution fees, and other “market-oriented mech-
anisms” to control pollution in national settings (see Bojö et al., pp. 92–111). Esty 
embraces such initiatives as fees, permits, and other types of property rights reg-
ulation at the international level but notes that some form of global authority will 
be needed if they are to be made effective (p. 79). He recommends an organiza-
tional structure that would defend a relatively small set of environmental prin-
ciples such as a principle that the agents responsible for negative environmental 
externalities should bear the costs of their actions (the “polluter pays” principle) 
or the principle that pollution prevention is to be preferred to pollution treat-
ment. The “global environmental organization” he proposes would pull together 
the current decentralized system of treaties and agreements and such organiza-
tions as the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) or the United Na-
tions Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), both of which Esty con-
siders to be too narrowly focused (pp. 90–91). 
In defining this organization, Esty relies heavily on analogies with the WTO 
and other international organizations. He notes that the International Labor Of-
fice (ILO) is an interesting model in that it involves private-sector business and 
labor organizations as well as governments (p. 95). WTO voting rules that em-
phasize consensus but tend to allow substantial scope for hegemonic leadership 
are offered as a useful model for an international environmental organization 
(p. 95). Esty argues that this organization could serve as a forum for discussion 
of environmental issues, encourage countries to harmonize their environmental 
legislation, serve as a clearinghouse for data and information on environmental 
questions, monitor agreements, and administer a fund aimed at resolving global 
environmental problems. There is little discussion in Esty’s proposal of enforce-
ment of negotiated environmental conventions. He does note that the idea of levy-
ing carbon taxes and other intrusive measures probably would encounter resis-
tance from sovereign nations and suggests that a way around this is to use funds 
362   E. W. F. Pe te r s o n i n Re vi e w of Ag R i c u l t uR A l ec on om i c s 22 (2000) 
contributed by member states to subsidize efforts to implement sound environ-
mental regulations (p. 84). Finally, he suggests that such an organization proba-
bly would need to concentrate initially on the most pressing problems, with the 
expectation that the scope of the organization would expand over time (p. 81). 
The first question raised by this proposal is whether such an organization 
would be feasible in the sense that its aggregate benefits would be greater than 
the aggregate costs at the same time that the benefits to individual nations would 
be seen as greater than the costs they would incur in participating in the organi-
zation. Note that the requirement that the net benefits for each individual nation 
have to be positive is ambiguous. As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, it is 
often the case that the politically powerful determine whether to participate in in-
ternational agreements, particularly in nondemocratic regimes. If these individ-
uals perceive that they will not benefit from an agreement, they may refuse to 
participate even if net national benefits are positive. The aggregate benefits of an 
international environmental organization would be any increases in environmen-
tal protection beyond what can be attained under current arrangements. Costs 
would include direct administrative and operating costs as well as costs associ-
ated with procuring and distributing information, enforcement, policing, and loss 
of autonomy. Information concerning the effects of various practices on the envi-
ronment, the costs of alternative solutions to environmental problems, and a host 
of other questions would be needed and could be costly. Some of this information 
is already being collected, so the increase in cost over the current situation may 
not be great. 
The most visible costs of an IEO would be the direct administrative costs. Scott 
suggests that cooperative agreements are costly to administer primarily because 
of different beliefs about the distribution of benefits and costs among the partic-
ipants and different sets of information on which to base judgments. Ensuring 
that all participants have access to the information they need to make informed 
decisions on rules and the functioning of the organization could be costly given 
the uncertainty associated with many global environmental problems. For exam-
ple, economic studies have produced widely varying estimates of the costs and 
benefits of alternative strategies for preventing global warming (Schmalensee; 
Weyant). Many feel that lack of scientific understanding and uncertainty concern-
ing both physical and economic impacts of greenhouse gas emissions mean that 
it would be premature to undertake draconian measures to reduce them (Nord-
haus; Poterba). Deciding which of the competing sets of information should be 
taken as the basis for discussion could be controversial, and this adds to organi-
zational costs because of the time and effort required to reach agreement. 
To get some sense of the size of potential costs and benefits, it is informative 
to refer to figures first suggested in the context of the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This 
conference addressed wide-ranging development issues as well as questions on 
the global environment. Two international environmental treaties (global climate 
change and biodiversity) were opened for signature at the Rio Summit, and two 
other documents, the Declaration of Rio de Janeiro and AGENDA 21, were ad-
opted after a great deal of preparatory work(Robinson). Estimates presented at 
the Rio Summit indicated that about $540 billion dollars per year would be re-
quired to accomplish the AGENDA 21 program, with $125 billion per year to be 
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supplied by high-income countries as development assistance and the rest com-
ing from the private sector and developing countries themselves (Sitarz, p. 310). 
Of the $125 billion in concessional assistance, about $15 billion would be devoted 
to global environmental issues, with the rest targeted at sustainable development 
programs in developing countries (Robinson). It is also estimated that $750 mil-
lion would be needed to “strengthen international institutions” (Robinson, p. 
678). The budget for UNEP is about $30 million per year, and the Global Envi-
ronmental Facility (GEF), established to assist developing countries with environ-
mental projects, operates a fund of about $2 billion (Esty, p. 87). For comparison, 
total world GDP in 1997 was about $30 trillion, U.S. GDP was $7.7 trillion, and 
the total value of world trade was $5.4 trillion (World Bank). On the other hand, 
official development assistance from OECD countries in 1997 was $48.3 billion, 
far less than the $125 billion called for in the AGENDA 21 program. Private finan-
cial flows at market rates were $128.5 billion in that year (OECD). 
Some of these cost estimates are difficult to interpret. The estimate of $540 bil-
lion in needed expenditure per year is both a cost and an indication of the size of 
the benefits. At about 1.8% of world income, expenditures of this size would seem 
to be somewhat unlikely. Current public and private flows for all purposes from 
the industrialized countries to the low-income countries amount to only about 
$175 billion, and it is unlikely that developing countries would be able to make 
up the difference out of their own resources. The authors of AGENDA 21 clearly 
feel that investments of this magnitude will prevent much greater environmen-
tal losses. On the other hand, the organizational costs identified are fairly modest, 
as is the UNEP budget. If these estimates are taken as reasonably accurate, the di-
rect costs of existing international organizations appear to be relatively small, and 
this is likely to be the case for an IEO as well, particularly if it is based initially on 
existing structures such as UNEP. However, these are not the only costs that en-
ter into the determination of the feasibility of the proposed organization. To the 
extent that the IEO is effective and international conventions on environmental 
protection are enforced, the costs associated with losses in autonomy or national 
sovereignty could be perceived by many governments as quite large. It is signif-
icant that numerous national delegations to the preparatory conferences for the 
Rio Summit expressed opposition to the creation of new environmental institu-
tions (Robinson, p. 690). Members of the international community have different 
environmental goals, as reflected by the differing needs and aspirations of indus-
trialized and less developed countries. Environmental protection is often seen by 
economists as a normal good in that demand for such efforts rises as incomes in-
crease (Sandler, 1997). In many low-income countries, protection of environmen-
tal amenities is seen as less important than promoting economic growth and rais-
ing living standards. This contrasts with the values attached to the environment 
in wealthy countries. These differences could mean that the respective win sets 
on environmental issues do not intersect. 
However, the existence of such agreements as the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) show that cooperation between low-
income and industrialized countries is not impossible. Less developed countries 
may see the costs of an IEO as quite large but be willing to participate if wealthier 
countries offer compensation or some other kind of incentive. Carraro and Sinis-
calco show that the gains from partial cooperation can be used to finance transfers 
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that induce others to join international coalitions. The idea of paying low-income 
countries to participate in environmental agreements is not without precedent. 
For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
includes a multilateral fund that will offer grants and loans to developing coun-
tries to help them finance the provisions of the agreement (Széll). In addition, the 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
provides for financial assistance from industrialized countries aimed at encourag-
ing low-income countries to adopt technologies that generate lower greenhouse 
gas emissions as well as to protect rain forests that act as carbon sinks (United 
Nations). Some transfers of this nature can be seen as a redefinition of property 
rights that would enhance institutional efficiency. Zilberman points out that de-
veloping countries receive few benefits from pharmaceutical products developed 
from rain forest organisms and thus have little incentive to preserve the rain for-
est. In this case, financial transfers may amount simply to payments for what 
rightfully belongs to developing countries. 
The differing environmental perspectives of developing and industrialized 
countries are not the only source of costs related to national sovereignty. The be-
lief that dispute-resolution provisions in both the NAFTA and Uruguay Round 
trade agreements constituted an infringement of national sovereignty led to fierce 
political opposition to these agreements in the United States. One way to reduce 
concerns over national sovereignty in an IEO may be to borrow the notion of sub-
sidiarity that has become a cornerstone of policies in the EU (Dietz et al.). Subsid-
iarity calls for policy initiatives to be carried out at the administrative level that is 
most appropriate for the issue being addressed. Thus local land-use policies and 
zoning laws should be administered by local and regional authorities rather than 
by EU bureaucrats in Brussels. On the other hand, broad policies related to the 
coordination of transportation within the EU, for example, require higher-level 
intervention. Subsidiarity is particularly relevant for the management of environ-
mental issues. There are many types of environmental problems, some of which 
are primarily local, whereas others require global action. In the spirit of subsid-
iarity, an IEO could limit the scope of its activities to environmental problems 
that are truly global (protecting the ozone layer, global warming), while local and 
regional issues are left to national and regional organizations. The distinction be-
tween local and global is often arbitrary, but it is likely that a working definition 
could be derived so that, for example, the world’s oceans would be considered 
part of the global commons, while acid rain in Europe would be seen as a Euro-
pean problem best left to regional organizations and purely national questions 
such as policies on mining would be left to national governments. The GEF ap-
pears to have made just such a distinction, targeting its funding at projects to pro-
tect the global climate, biodiversity, the ozone layer, and common property water 
resources (Esty). Dividing responsibility for the different types of environmental 
issues between national, regional, and global organizations may help to assuage 
fears that an IEO would violate national sovereignty. On the other hand, U.S. op-
position to the Kyoto Protocol shows that concerns about infringements of na-
tional sovereignty can come into play even when an agreement pertains to a truly 
global issue. 
If the global benefits of an IEO are greater than the information, compensa-
tion, autonomy, and other administrative costs, and if the perceived benefits for 
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each participating nation are greater than its perceived costs, the IEO would be 
feasible. If an IEO appears to be feasible, the form, structure, and scope of the or-
ganization can be addressed. The 171 treaties, protocols, and agreements listed 
in the UNEP register address an extraordinarily diverse set of issues. For exam-
ple, there are agreements on international common property (fisheries, forests, 
the ozone layer, global climate), transboundary pollution or pollution of jointly 
held air and water resources (acid rain), protection of wildlife (whales, migratory 
birds), regional management of environmental resources (the Niger River Ba-
sin, the Rhine, the Mediterranean Sea, Antarctica), hazardous substances (nuclear 
waste, benzene), protection of the world heritage (archaeological, artistic, histori-
cal), control of pests (desert locusts) and protection of farm animals and plant re-
sources, and regulation of military activities. Not only do these agreements cover 
a large number of issues, the type of market failure addressed by the different 
kinds of agreements varies widely. For example, the type of externality related to 
marine mammal protection is different from the public goods problem associated 
with protecting the ozone layer. In the first case, the issue concerns whose rights 
to the use of marine mammals are to be supported, those who wish to consume 
the resource by killing it as opposed to those who wish to consume it by preserv-
ing it. In the case of the ozone layer, the issue is how to prevent free-riding on the 
efforts of others to protect the upper atmosphere. 
The wide variety of agreements that have been reached raises an issue of com-
prehensiveness when considering the design of an IEO. An IEO charged with man-
aging all these diverse agreements could become so complex that it would be ex-
tremely costly to organize and run. The principle of subsidiarity discussed earlier 
would have the added advantage of limiting the scope of the organization to a 
more manageable set of problem areas. Thus the IEO might serve as an umbrella 
organization to oversee agreements on greenhouse gases, ocean pollution, the Ant-
arctic, wildlife (whales, migratory birds), world heritage sites, and hazardous ma-
terials, for example. It also might serve as a resource for scientific information that 
could be drawn on by organizations charged with managing river basins or con-
trolling transboundary pollution that affects a limited number of countries. For is-
sues that can be handled within nations, it would have no direct responsibilities. 
The environmental side agreement to NAFTA is consistent with this type of ap-
proach. It emphasizes the enforcement of national environmental policies by do-
mestic institutional structures rather than assuming direct administrative responsi-
bilities for environmental protection in the region (Beaulieu and Johnson). 
The advantage of a centralized organization, even if its scope is somewhat lim-
ited through subsidiarity and respect for national sovereignty, is that there may 
be economies of scale that would reduce the total administrative costs compared 
with the present decentralized system. Esty argues that the current environmen-
tal regime is characterized by: 
… confusion, duplication and incoherence. A dozen different U.N. agencies, the 
secretariats to a number of environmental treaties and conventions, the World 
Bank, regional political groups, and the world’s 190 countries acting individu-
ally try to cope with the planet’s environmental problems [p. 78]. 
This suggests that there could be efficiency gains and reduction of duplication 
from creating an IEO to oversee at least part of this diverse set of organizations. 
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 However, it would still be useful for such an organization to center its activi-
ties on the defense of a limited set of basic principles. The WTO secretariat, for ex-
ample, has been able to coordinate a significant number of regional trade agree-
ments, commodity agreements, preferential trade arrangements (e.g., the Lomé 
Convention), free-trade areas, and customs unions alongside its primary mission 
to promote multilateral trade liberalization. But all these institutions derive from 
a common philosophical perspective that highlights the benefits of free trade and 
attempts to limit exceptions to its basic principle of nondiscrimination. This ex-
ample suggests that a focus on a narrow range of principles may be important in 
defining the scope of an IEO. 
The scope of an IEO is not the only design question that needs to be resolved. 
The benefits and costs associated with an IEO will depend on the number of par-
ticipants, the degree of integration, and the type of decision rule chosen. If the 
IEO is designed to focus on such inherently global issues as protecting the ozone 
layer, it may be necessary for it to include virtually all the countries in the world. 
This clearly raises the organizational and operating costs. The necessary inclu-
siveness of such an IEO and the importance of the participation and leadership of 
the most powerful countries have implications for the degree of integration of the 
organization. Cauley et al. suggest that a loose organization would leave almost 
complete autonomy to the participants, whereas increasing the degree of integra-
tion reduces their independence. The more tightly the organization is structured, 
the more likely it is that it will be capable of controlling free-riding by the partici-
pants, thereby ensuring that a more nearly optimal level of global environmental 
protection is provided. This suggests that an effective IEO would have to be not 
only inclusive but also tightly structured. However, while tightly structured or-
ganizations would appear to be more effective at controlling free-riding, the ex-
perience with the Law of the Sea treaty suggests that an organization based on a 
high degree of integration could be undermined by the defections of important 
participants (Sebenius). Sandler suggests that many international environmental 
agreements, including the Montreal Protocol, have been set up initially as loosely 
structured conventions that subsequently were made more intrusive as the un-
certainties surrounding the nature of the environmental problem were reduced. 
Esty recognizes this issue, arguing that the proposed organization should focus 
initially on the most critical environmental problems, with the expectation that its 
scope might expand over time. 
Finally, the decision rule chosen is an important factor in the costs and bene-
fits of an IEO. The WTO decides on the basic rules of international trade with a 
unanimity rule. The EU uses a system of weighted-majority voting that allows a 
coalition of one or two large countries plus one or two small countries to form a 
blocking minority. For certain decisions, the United Nations uses majority voting, 
whereas other cases are resolved through unanimity of a small subset of mem-
bers. An IEO might follow the WTO model by requiring full consensus on the es-
tablishment of minimum environmental standards. Such an arrangement would 
raise the decision-making costs, although the exercise of strong leadership by a 
subset of powerful members could help to overcome this problem. In addition, if 
most of the difficult decisions stem from differences in objectives between indus-
trialized and developing countries, the compensation mechanisms discussed ear-
lier could soften the impact of a unanimity rule. 
su P r an ati o n al or g an i z ati o n s F o r in te r n a ti o n a l Pub li c go o d s    367
Based on the preceding analysis, it appears that a feasible IEO would have 
to be inclusive but loosely structured initially to obtain the support of sovereign 
nations with diverse goals and interests. A decision rule emphasizing consensus 
would provide assurance to participating governments that they would be able 
to prevent decisions that appeared highly unfavorable to their national interests. 
These design attributes mean that the suggested IEO might not generate enough 
of an increase in environmental benefits compared with the status quo regime to 
justify the administrative costs of the organization. Determining both the feasi-
bility and form of an IEO would require knowledge of the increases in benefits 
and costs compared with the current system and the relation of these changes to 
the degree of integration, number of participants, and the decision rule. Because 
the benefit and cost schedules are not easy to identify, the preceding discussion 
of the design of an IEO is somewhat speculative. Nevertheless, it seems clear that 
a tightly structured organization would be unacceptable to many governments 
and that the most reasonable organizational structure would be one that relies on 
subsidiarity and leaves most enforcement to national institutions. It might be ex-
pected that tighter structures could be introduced as environmental understand-
ing increases and national consensuses begin to converge. 
Conclusion 
Clearly, a great many more details would need to be worked out in order 
to decide if an IEO would be feasible and, if so, what the precise configuration 
ought to be. The analysis in the preceding section draws attention to the impor-
tance of defining a narrow set of fundamental principles to serve as the basis for 
the organization and operation of such a set of institutions. Principles such as the 
polluter-pays principle and an emphasis on enforcement of domestic legislation 
could help to provide assurance that other countries are not free-riding. As noted 
by Cauley et al., the development of positive conjectures about the behavior of the 
other participants is of great importance in reinforcing cooperation. The analysis 
also suggests that an IEO would have to be inclusive to be effective. This raises a 
serious question concerning feasibility because costs increase with the number of 
participants. If most of the nations of the world need to join the IEO for it to re-
alize its objectives, some mechanisms for compensation and, perhaps, redistribu-
tion of income may be needed to overcome the resistance of developing coun-
tries more concerned with economic growth than environmental degradation. A 
critical design element identified in the preceding section is the choice of deci-
sion rule. If the IEO includes many countries, it may be necessary to allow sub-
stantial latitude for members to veto particular decisions. While a unanimity rule 
raises the costs of decision making, participation in an IEO that generates signifi-
cant autonomy costs may not be forthcoming unless the decision-making process 
emphasizes consensus. Finally, it would be important for an IEO to be loosely 
structured initially to gain adherence from countries worried about their national 
sovereignty. Such a structure could evolve toward a more intrusive organization 
once more general agreement on the advantages of subjecting national policies to 
international supervision had been reached. 
The critical issue is whether such an organization would generate sufficient ben-
efits to offset the costs of negotiation and administration. These costs could be sig-
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nificant, and it is important to recognize that large international bureaucracies can 
themselves be a source of inefficiency and waste. On the other hand, Esty points 
to a great deal of duplication and confusion in the current system. The benefits of 
an effective IEO would include the reduction of these costs as well as the potential 
for a more nearly optimal provision of global environmental protection. An added 
benefit of such an organization would be to put the international environmental re-
gime on the same footing as other international regimes such as the one governing 
international trade. It is clear that the need for improved coordination of the trade 
and environmental regimes will receive increased attention in the coming years, 
but much of the discussion will take place at the initiative of the WTO. In addi-
tion, there are many coordination issues that involve the environmental regime and 
other international regimes such as those targeting international security, foreign 
aid and development, and human rights. A centralized environmental organiza-
tion may prove more effective at ensuring a hearing for environmental interests as 
these issues arise than the present decentralized system. 
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